INTRODUCTION
During his eight years in office, President Barack Obama changed the face of the federal judiciary. A total of 331 of his federal judicial nominees were confirmed, a larger number (by one) than President George W. Bush had confirmed during his eight year term. 1 At the time that Donald J. Trump became the President of the United States in January of 2017, approximately two-thirds of federal district court judges and approximately half of federal circuit judges had been nominated by Democratic presidents.
2 Several Obama nominees have the promise to be major voices on the federal bench for decades to come.
3 President Obama successfully nominated two justices to the  Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University School of Law. My thanks to the Wisconsin Law Review for their invitation to participate in this symposium. A disclaimer: I participated in various capacities in many of these nominations controversies, and have written about many of them for popular audiences. One of the goals of this Essay is to provide some theoretical heft to tie together a lot of what I have been doing for and writing about for larger audiences. For their comments on this Essay, I would like to thank Michael Abramowicz, Thomas Colby, Aziz Huq, Orin Kerr, and Peter Smith. For many discussions over the years on these issues, special thanks to Micah Schwartzman. 25, 2016) , https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/trump-to-inherit-more-than-100-courtvacancies-plans-to-reshape-judiciary/2016/12/25/d190dd18-c928-11e6-85b5-76616a33048d_story.html?utm_term=.dce24dc0ebe5 [https://perma.cc/GG79-EEAK].
3.
See David Fontana, Obama Has Started Making Major Progress on Nominating Judges-and This Is His Most
Important One Yet, NEW REPUBLIC (May 13, 2014), https://newrepublic.com/article/117747/pamela-harris-fourth-circuit-court-whyliberals-should-cheer-her [https://perma.cc/E3E7-HNLP] (identifying Fourth Circuit Judge Pamela Harris as an important nominee); David Fontana, Obama's Shocking Supreme Court, both of whom (in different ways) have the potential to contribute to the liberal jurisprudential cause for many years to come. 4 President Obama's federal judicial nominees were the most diverse along many dimensions of any president in the history of the United States.
5 Some of these accomplishments were made possible by the controversial decision by Senate Democrats in 2013 to abolish the filibuster for lower court nominations. 6 The perfect should not be the enemy of the good, but the good enough should not distract progressives from what could have been better for their judicial agenda. President Obama did a lot for the federal courts, but could have done more. President Trump inherited 103 judicial vacancies from President Obama, almost twice the amount President Obama inherited from President George W. Bush. 7 Empirical measures suggest that President Obama's nominees were more moderate, as compared to the more ideologically conservative nature of the nominees of past Republican presidents. 8 This was true even after , http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/president-obama-the-legacy/obama-s-legacyjudicial-appointments-numbers-n709306 [https://perma.cc/CD58-VWLX] ("The more than 300 Obama-nominated judges are considered to be the most diverse group in U.S. history in terms of terms of gender, ethnicity, and nationality.").
6. ) ("Our analysis shows that the growing ideological gap between Democratic-appointed justices and Republican-appointed justices is largely attributable to the appointment of conservative Republican nominees."). Administration did not avail itself of a supply side of uncooperative tools used to approach judicial nominations, and focused mostly on cooperative approaches to judicial nominations.
The Obama Administration's approach to judicial nominations, in other words, featured asymmetric usage of "constitutional hardball" 13 or "constitutional showdowns." 14 In addition to the tactical argument, this Essay has a taxonomical goal. Judicial nominations are a unique field of political activity, 15 in which a series of more aggressive political strategies have emerged, yet have not previously been identified and described. For both the tactical and the taxonomical, the goal is to take a step back from the day-to-day politics of judicial nominations to make some larger, more theoretical observations about the eight years of judicial nominations by the Obama Administration that will shed some light to inform later presidencies.
In game theoretic terms, the closest way to explain this would be as follows. Engaging in a non-cooperative strategy with a cooperative opponent yields a suboptimal result. 16 There are not the political costs contrast, is best understood as a coalition of social groups seeking various forms of government action. Most Democratic supporters in the mass public are attracted to the party for reasons of group interest or identity rather than a devotion to the principles of liberalism."). for being aggressive that existed before our age of polarization, and indeed there are political benefits to being aggressive. Because the violation of cooperative norms generates a greater backlash by opponents and supporters alike-without the political resources necessary to overcome those greater political costs-non-cooperative strategies fail in a largely cooperative environment for three related reasons. 17 In the context of judicial nominations, the assumption was that Republican Senators and affiliated interest groups were not engaged in "empire-building government."
18 A more aggressive strategy by the Obama Administration would therefore have generated additional political costs by antagonizing the opposition. 19 Second, these direct political costs generate additional opportunity costs. 181, 206 (1997) ("In most cases, the two-track system keeps filibusters out of the public eye."); id. at 181 ("Filibusters are ubiquitous but virtually invisible, for the contemporary Senate practice does not require a senator to hold the floor to filibuster; senators filibuster simply by indicating to the Senate leadership that they intend to do so.").
or a stimulus package to protect the economy. Third, the assumption is that there is not the same political energy and therefore not the same political resources within the Democratic Party on judicial nominations to overcome political costs as there is in the Republican Party.
22
Aggressive strategies generate new political enemies and no new-but much needed-political friends.
However, judicial nominations have increasingly become a noncooperative environment in which non-cooperative strategies fare better. Now that both political parties are increasingly polarized, the incentives to cooperate with the other political party are much lower. 23 The result is that more and more fields of political action are dominated by political parties that do not respect traditional written and unwritten norms of cooperation. In this environment, non-cooperative strategies perform increasingly better. More aggressive strategies to accomplish more transformative outcomes generate the same political costs in terms of opposition as do less aggressive strategies. More aggressive strategies generate more political resources in terms of active and engaged support from political allies.
The tactical argument for the possibilities generated by more aggressive approaches to judicial nominations is made in the context of a series of identifiable practices towards judicial nominations that have emerged in past presidential administrations, yet were relatively underutilized during the Obama Administration. These tactical tools are helpful whether the task is nominating a district court judge, a circuit court judge, or a Supreme Court Justice, and are helpful when controlling the Senate or facing a Senate controlled by the opposition party.
I label these three tactical tools-visible outside of the nominations context as well-as naming, numbing, and numbers. Naming means an Administration selecting nominees that identify their jurisprudential perspective with a particular frame-such as originalism-and promoting these nominees by also using that name. system is distracted from other nominees by the controversial political or actual nominee, and other nominees are framed as less controversial because their views are distorted by comparison to the controversial potential or actual nominees. Numbers refers to the simultaneous nomination of a large number of judges to the federal bench. The volume of nominees precludes the opposition from being able to direct resources towards a critical mass of nominees, and also generates political pressure to confirm a critical mass so as to avoid being labeled as obstructing the Senate.
Two caveats are worth making. First, it could be that the Obama Administration's record on judicial nominations was a purposefully lost opportunity, in that the nature and number of its nominees reflected genuinely revealed preferences of the President leading the efforts of the Administration. President Obama himself wrote before becoming President 24 -and indicated when he was President 25 -that he was quite content with a more limited role for the federal courts and therefore a more limited focus on judicial nominations. Scholars affiliated with the political left had spent at least a decade before President Obama took office in 2009 exploring the theoretical merits of "taking the Constitution away from the courts" 26 and focusing increasingly on popular constitutionalism.
27
The Obama Administration, though, featured its share of cause lawyers inside the Administration and liberal groups outside of the Administration advocating for efforts to shape the federal bench. 28 Later Democratic Administrations surely will feature those constituencies as well. This Essay is meant to provide a tactical roadmap to frame their approach.
24.
See Second, this Essay is about the boundaries of the possible, not the desirability of the possible. The goal is to identify the possibilities for Democratic Presidents wishing to prioritize judicial nominations, and the tactical approaches to achieve these possibilities that are often neglected in scholarly and public discussions. Identifying more aggressive strategies that could have worked is not the same as saying these strategies should be utilized all things considered. A complete normative evaluation of uncooperative approaches to judicial nominations would have to consider, for instance, whether uncooperative behavior is justified as a tactical response to initially uncooperative behavior, or whether the damage to our institutional norms generated by any uncooperative behavior is too great.
29
I. NAMING Judicial nominations are a unique occasion to define and promote the jurisprudential vision that a presidential administration desires-to name that vision. The large stakes involved in judicial nominations means that nominations serve as a focal point to coordinate legal activities and construct a name for the associated jurisprudential vision. The microphone provided by the stakes of judicial nominations provides an occasion to promote that name and the associated jurisprudential vision. Naming does not generate any additional opposition to nominees in the Senate, because senators will often pin names on nominees not deserving of such labels. Naming does, though, mobilize political resources behind a judicial nominee and the President promoting that nominee.
The act of naming the jurisprudential vision that a presidential administration wishes to promote is a crucial part of promoting the success of that jurisprudential vision. Scholars in the social sciences have often referred to this act of naming as constructing a "frame," or a "schemata of interpretation" that encourages people to "locate, perceive, identify and label" experiences and events into a coherent whole. 30 of the public do not have the interest or the aptitude to engage in sophisticated analysis of complicated jurisprudential debates, so the name attached to a position can be important. 37 The name constructs what arguments are considered "on the wall" and "off the wall." 38 The mere fact that those in power are using this name and grouping arguments together with that name moves the jurisprudential debate in the direction of that name by dominating the public debate about legal issues.
39
Scholars such as Reva Siegel and Steven Teles have, for instance, identified the role that originalism plays as a name both to identify the problems with the Warren Court and to promote the alternative approach to judging that Republican presidents have supported. (2011) (noting how these names serve as "signals that are received by intermediary groupsincluding politicians and media commentators -who then amplify and retransmit them to members of the cultural groups who look to them for guidance").
37. See Greene, supra note 36, at 710 ("So too the language of originalism, and particularly its appeal to scientific norms, satisfies a public demand for a digestible means of muting conflict over unresolved issues of constitutional law.") (citations omitted).
38. Judicial nominations play an important role in the construction and promotion of the name that the presidential administration wishes to promote. Nominations serve as a "focal point" permitting those inside and outside of an administration to coordinate themselves. 44 Because of the stakes of judicial nominations, disparate interests will sit down across the table to debate and discuss their constitutional visions. These conversations can generate conflict about a name, but also move these interests closer towards a consensus about what that name should be. Stakeholders convened together recognize that without a name, their shared and separate interests will suffer. Indeed, this is a version of what happened during the Reagan Administration. 45 Theorists outside of the government, lawyers inside of the government, and activists in between worked together to identify and agree on the originalism name as an initial frame. 46 The converse of this is true, too: if an administration does not focus on generating a name, no focal point will be constructed, no multi-interest conversations will ensue, and no movement towards a naming consensus will result.
Once agreed upon, this name also serves as a pre-commitment devise shaping other nominations. 47 It is easier to monitor the president selecting nominees, the Senate evaluating nominees, and the interest groups promoting or opposing nominees once their shared jurisprudential commitment has a name. Consider, for instance, the reaction of conservative interest groups once President George W. Bush nominated Harriet Miers and these interest groups learned she was not using the name or arguments associated with their originalist preferences. 48 
43.
For (2003) ("When precommitting himself, a person acts at one point in time in order to ensure that at some later time he will perform an act that he could but would not have performed without that prior act. As I define it, precommitment requires an observable action, not merely a mental resolution." Judicial nominations also play an important role in promoting the jurisprudential vision. For lower court nominations, the nomination by a president of a candidate affiliated with that name and the affiliated jurisprudential vision signals to the legal community that the president is serious about promoting that vision. Advocates making their case to the administration on policy and legal matters will know of the jurisprudential philosophy that the administration support. 49 Lawyers arguing before judges appointed by the administration will know what types of arguments that judge is more likely to find convincing. 50 Ambitious lawyers desiring a judicial or other nomination by the administration will know that familiarity with and usage of that name will help their chances.
51
For Supreme Court nominations, naming plays this promotional role in the eyes of the public as well. 52 Critical interest groups aspire to hold senators and presidents accountable for their nominations behavior and their consistency with particular jurisprudential commitments. 
F.E.C.
55 -the public is paying far greater attention to the judicial system during a Supreme Court nomination than at any other moment. 56 The public does not pay great attention to the nuances of legal arguments, and so these confirmation hearings and the debates surrounding them generate a sense of what legal arguments are plausible and desirable. This sense is furthered if these arguments are framed together with a unifying name. 57 The Senate confirmation hearing surrounding the nomination of Robert Bork to the Supreme Court, for instance, was seen as a public demonstration of the "intellectual seriousness" and salience of originalism.
58 Chief Justice John Roberts described his role as that of an "umpire," 59 using a name that stimulated major public attention. 60 Justice Sonia Sotomayor's remark earlier in her career that being a "wise Latina" 61 could shape her jurisprudence likewise became a name that pervaded public discussion about her nomination.
Republican presidents have tended more openly to locate and promote judges who embrace the name originalism. The lesson supposedly learned from Bork's defeat was to hide legal views during hearings. 67 Conservative nominees have therefore used the o-word less often explicitly, but still some of the time, and even when not using it directly have made arguments about judging that are part of the originalist project.
During the second Bush Administration, nominees to the lower federal courts reflected and reinforced these naming efforts. Law professor Michael McConnell was one of the most influential originalist the Reagan/Meese reports stand out as unprecedented in their combination of great specificity, comprehensiveness, and sheer ambition.").
63. as his Supreme Court nominee, he mentioned that she was "one of the nation's foremost legal minds," and he mentioned several times during the Senate's consideration of her that she clerked for the Supreme Court.
76 Names are supposed to signal partiality rather than the objectivity that presidents and senators are supposed to desire from their judicial nominees. With better filtration mechanisms, we all know that judges nominated by Democratic presidents tend to be more liberal than those nominated by Republican presidents, 77 but to admit this and desire this openly can be an uncooperative political act.
Democrats working on judicial nominations have argued that naming is therefore counterproductive because of the excessive cost generated by it. A judicial nominee who uses the name affiliated with a governing judicial philosophy-such as using the phrase "living constitutionalism"-places a bullseye on his or her back. Interest groups pull the "fire alarm"
78 and notify relevant senators of the problematic nominee. 79 Senators from the party of the president elected from swing states will be less inclined to support the nominee. procedural roadblocks that Senate rules afford senators from the minority party.
81
The argument is one sounding in the tactical benefits of avoiding candor. 82 The same nominee presented to the Senate without using the name affiliated with his or her jurisprudential approach does not generate the costs imposed by political opponents. That nominee is therefore more likely to become a judge promoting that approach if he or she does not use the name affiliated with the approach when nominated. Nominees that have the potential to promote the name of the jurisprudence supported by the presidential administration would do better to disavow their preferences in favor of neutral, technocratic preferences.
83
The additional costs of naming are also harder to endure for a Democratic administration because of the supposed absence of political supports. Overcoming the additional vetogates put in front of a naming nominee requires constituencies who are willing to expend political resources on judicial nominations. Interest groups like the Judicial Crisis Network pledged to spend $10 million to secure the confirmation of Neil Gorsuch to the Supreme Court. 84 Republican primary voters want to hear from their candidates that they will nominate committed originalists to the bench. 85 It is more challenging for the Democratic Party to mobilize such efforts on behalf of judicial nominations.
The result is that the Obama Administration avoided this naming dynamic. Their first judicial nominee was David Hamilton, nominated
81.
See by President Obama to serve on the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Hamilton was selected precisely because he was not affiliated with any overarching jurisprudential agenda. 86 The argument for not naming was one based in the logic of reciprocal cooperation: by naming someone not affiliated with any liberal vision, the goal of the Obama Administration was aiming to "reduce the partisan contentiousness of judicial confirmation battles of recent years."
87 Hamilton received the same treatment during his hearings and in the votes in committee and on the Senate floor that a candidate more known for and embracing naming would have received. 88 The result was simple: a respected Seventh Circuit judge but one without any discernible benefit for an alternative vision of the law, and yet one who required the same expenditure of political effort and generated the same opposition as a naming judge.
This pattern recurred often during the eight years of the Obama Administration. Nominees affiliated with the efforts to create a liberal alternative to originalism were rarely seriously considered, let alone nominated. When candidates like this were nominated, efforts were immediately made to distance themselves from any naming efforts. President Obama mentioned his desire for a justice that was guided by empathy, defined as "understanding and identifying with people's hopes and struggles."
89 Justice Sotomayor, though, rejected the empathy label and any other liberal name or jurisprudential vision during her confirmation hearings. 90 
86.
See Lewis, supra note 19 ("The administration official said part of the reason for making the Hamilton nomination the administration's first public entry into the often contentious field of judicial selection was to serve 'as a kind of signal' about the kind of nominees Mr. Obama will select. The official spoke on the condition of anonymity because the nomination had not been officially made."); Toobin, supra note 19 ("The hope was that Hamilton's appointment would begin a profound and rapid change in the confirmation process and in the federal judiciary itself.").
87 90. See Goldstein & Kane, supra note 52 ("The hearings were a moment of history that liberals had awaited for 15 years: an opportunity for a Democratic president's Supreme Court nominee to inject into the public dialogue fresh ideas about the Constitution and the law, beginning to recalibrate a court that has gravitated to the right. Yet Sotomayor did not articulate such a vision. In answering Cardin, and in scores of other times during four intense days in the witness chair, she eluded efforts of Democrats and Republicans alike to draw out any statement of liberal thought.").
Goodwin Liu was actively involved in the American Constitution Society for Law and Public Policy and widely known as a scholar advocating progressive understandings of the Constitution. When he was nominated to the Ninth Circuit, The Washington Post proclaimed that his nomination "energized the left" 91 because of these features of his background. During his nomination process, Liu's supporters disavowed any sentiment like that-and Liu eventually did so himself. Liu rejected Justice Sotomayor's "wise Latina" remarks. 92 He rejected the idea of a "living Constitution." 93 He described himself as embracing the originalist name, stating that he is committed to "the original meaning of constitutional provisions where original meaning refers to 'the underlying principles that the Framers' words were publicly understood to convey . . . ."
94 He disavowed his own earlier argument that the Constitution might reflect a concern with social and economic inequalities. 95 The absence of naming also creates its own incentive structure within the field of judicial nominations. It is individually rational for nominees to avoid naming even if it is not collectively rational for presidential administrations to do so. The individual nominee who names simply makes themselves the subject of a fire alarm and increases their chances of being rejected for the federal bench. Interest groups opposed to the candidate are mobilized because of the unusual practice of a nominee engaging in naming. Interest groups can then successfully mobilize senators to oppose the candidate. The nominees who are confirmed are therefore those who do not name, which incentivizes the President to nominate other nominees who do not name.
The point of this Essay is that this rejection of naming was tactically unwise. Refusing to name means that jurisprudence is being played using the other team's rulebook. Lawyers and judges are left making arguments for their perspective using the linguistic and rhetorical tools developed for the opposing perspective. judges are left to communicate to their political and public supporterslet alone their legal ones-using the tools that are known to be utilized previously by their strongest opponents. Lawyers and judges desire to make arguments that can be considered "off the wall" because their perspectives have not been named and therefore elaborated. The failure to name during the judicial nominations process of the Obama Administration was a substantial lost opportunity. The past decade has featured the most sustained effort among liberal academics, judges, and justices to devise a name and a vision for their jurisprudence in at least a generation. The first year of the Obama Administration featured an edited book by Jack Balkin and Reva Siegel entitled The Constitution in 2020, featuring a series of essays meant to respond to the Reagan Administration's blueprint The Constitution in 2000. 96 Justice Stephen Breyer authored a book in 2005 97 and then one again in 2011 meant to provide a liberal alternative to originalism. 98 Jack M. Balkin's book Living Originalism in 2011 likewise aimed to provide scaffolding for a liberal jurisprudential vision. 99 These attempts to provide a name and a vision did not feature in the remarks of President Obama's judicial nominees, who instead largely either raised the names and visions associated with originalism and umpires, or responded to questions about them. Contrast that with the energy surrounding originalism in the 1980's, and how that energy was manifested through confirmation hearings like those of Bork to the Supreme Court in 1987. This is not only a problematic state of affairs for a Democratic administration, but an unnecessary one. The evidence suggests that naming does not clearly elicit greater obstruction in a political environment as polarized as the present one. Supreme Court nominations are a unique political animal, but in the past era naming did not seem to matter that much, except on the extremes with Bork. A candidate that names an approach to the law can create precisely the cognitive prime to generate similar political resources on the political left. A nominee known previously for his or her devotion to naming who then engages in naming during their confirmation process signals to their supporters the sincerity and seriousness of his or her devotion to the jurisprudential cause. 110 The name itself that he or she uses can motivate and mobilize supporters more. The importance of "empathy" in judging and the benefits of a "wise Latina" on the bench are arguments that resonate with liberal styles of political reasoning and would motivate political liberals. The Senate's refusal to vote on Merrick Garland could be the appointments-related cause that mobilizes progressives in the way that Bork's defeat mobilized conservatives. Garland, though, was not a mobilizing defeat in the way that Bork's defeat was. 116 Garland was a creature of the Washington legal establishment, rather than a lawyer or judge dedicating to branding and directing that legal establishment with naming or jurisprudence.
117
One other note on naming is in order. Naming can be effective even if the nominee engaged in the task does not have a realistic chance of being confirmed-because, for instance, the Senate is controlled by the party opposing the President (as it was for President Obama his last two years in office). The Bork nomination is a great example of this. Even in defeat, it consolidated conservative senators and interest groups behind originalism, and gave originalism a microphone louder than it had ever had previously. As Douglas NeJaime has written about litigation, there can even be a unique value in losing legal battles. 
II. NUMBING
One other dimension of nominations accomodationism has to do with what I will call "numbing." Not all potential or actual nominees are created equal. Presidential administrations and their supporters can use unusually provocative nominees with great power. An administration or its supporters can "plant" the name of a potential extreme nominee in the media, 119 or actually nominate that candidate. This numbs the political system by generating nominee "extremeness aversion." 120 Political resources are directed towards opposing this nominee or ensuring that no additional similar nominees are selected, thereby directing oppositional resources away from other potential or actual nominees. Political elites and public opinion are cognitively distorted by the possibility of this nominee, making other nominees seem less objectionable.
Many features of a potential or actual nominee can make him or her unusually provocative. Because of his or her youthful age, a nominee can be significant because he or she will serve on the bench for a long time and could be nominated to a higher position at a later time.
121 When President George W. 122. See Mark Greenbaum, Double Take, NEW REPUBLIC (May 2, 2010), https://newrepublic.com/article/74728/double-take [https://perma.cc/CNF3-L7LC] ("The same qualities that had earned him a nomination-his youth, political leanings, and minority background-perversely worked against him: Fearing that Estrada would sit atop a list of possible Supreme Court picks once he became a judge, Senate Democrats waged a harsh two-year campaign against him.").
provocative. 123 Potential or actual nominees that promise to be more jurisprudentially extreme can also be unusually provocative. When President Trump was considering William J. Pryor for the Supreme Court in 2017, commentators described him as "the most polarizing" potential nominee because of many provocative comments over the years, 124 including his testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee when nominated to the Eleventh Circuit that Roe v. Wade had led to the "slaughter of millions of unborn children." 125 Numbing has several tactical benefits. First, numbing directs resources towards the potential or actual extreme nominee and away from other nominees. Opposition interest groups conduct opposition research on that potential nominee to be able to demonstrate how extreme that potential nominee is. 126 Opposition interest groups solicit contributions from their supporters by mentioning their efforts to prevent and/or defeat that nominee. Senators from the opposing party inform the administration of the problems with such an extreme nominee. The media features stories documenting the extreme jurisprudential perspectives of the potential nominee, and get prominent sources on the record to state that this potential nominee is extreme.
Meanwhile, other potential nominees benefit from the resources expended on the extreme nominee by not facing the same degree of scrutiny. Opposition interest groups have not compiled the dossier on or motivated their supporters to oppose other nominees. Senators have not signaled to the administration their sentiments on other nominees, leaving an administration capable of claiming less opposition for that nominee. Media coverage of other nominees explicitly or implicitly contrasts them with the more extreme nominee. 126. See Scherer, Bartels & Steigerwalt, supra note 79 ("[W]e theorize that a principal function of interest groups in the lower court confirmation process is to act as 'fire marshals' for the Senate. By alerting the Senate to problematic nominees, interest groups aid the Senate in its constitutional mission under Article II to provide 'advice and consent' to the president on all life-tenured federal court nominations.").
Second, numbing shapes elite and public sentiments towards the actual or potential nominee. Political attention rarely focuses on judicial nominees, particularly for the lower federal courts. Interest groups sound the "fire alarm" that the nominee is extreme. 127 When these same citizens hear that the fire did not transpire-that the extreme nominee was not nominated or that relatively few extreme nominees were selected-they are less concerned about the other nominees. After Bork was defeated, a conservative federal judge like Douglas Ginsburg did not seem as extreme. 128 Likewise, after President Trump did not nominate Pryor, a conservative federal judge like Neil Gorsuch did not seem as extreme. 129 Numbing also has a signaling benefit for the president. It signals to relevant lawyers and judges what jurisprudential perspectives are "on the wall" and "off the wall." 130 Lawyers aspiring to judicial (or other) nominations in that administration is thereby authorized to move jurisprudentially towards the extreme nominee, since that extreme nominee was at least considered-and was possibly nominated-for a powerful federal judicial position. Empirical studies have demonstrated that judges behave strategically when desiring elevation, so the trickledown effects on state judges or lower federal courts seeking elevation could be substantial. 131 Consider, for instance, the situation surrounding George W. Bush's nomination of Janice Rogers Brown to the D.C. Circuit. Brown was described as manifesting "evidence of extremism." 132 Brown had described liberalism as flawed in the same way that slavery was.
133
While one or two senators will often attended many hearings for presidential nominees, senatorial attention to Brown was substantial.
Senator Dick Durbin from Illinois, one of the leaders of the Senate Democrats, attended her hearings with many prepared and complicated questions.
134 Then-Senator Barack Obama made a speech from the Senate floor opposing Brown. 135 The list of those on the record before the Senate opposing her nomination was enormous and unusual. 136 This distraction generated lesser scrutiny for other candidates the Senate was considering around the same time. Senate Democrats during the Bush Administration focused their opposition on provocative nominees like Brown and Pryor, and were forced to justify this obstruction by noting that "the Senate has confirmed dozens of judicial nominees with little or no debate."
137 Nominees that would normally be provocative sailed through the confirmation process-relatively speaking at least-because the system had been numbed by nominees like Brown and Pryor. Diane Sykes, later considered a strongly conservative federal judge on the Seventh Circuit, was confirmed 70-27 without anywhere near the opposition while Brown and Pryor's nominations were pending.
138 Brett Kavanaugh, a young and talented Bush White House staffer, was nominated in January of 2006 with much fanfare and controversy. 139 The opposition resources he consumed meant those resources were not directed at another young and talented nominee, Neil Gorsuch-later to be nominated to the Supreme Courtwho sailed through on a voice vote. Other actual nominees had written records that suggested a jurisprudential perspective so provocative that they also distorted perspectives of the ideological positions of other nominees. When President Trump considered Pryor for the Supreme Court, progressive interest groups like the Alliance for Justice went on the record opposing Pryor specifically as ideologically extreme. 140 The New York Times favorably contrasted Gorsuch with Pryor, whose "credentials, erudition and more muted stances" were discussed "as compared with Judge Pryor."
141
For the cooperative political actor, numbing is problematic. A youthful nominee is meant to capture a scarce seat on the federal bench potentially for half a century, meaning that many later presidentsincluding presidents of the opposing political party-will not have the opportunity to select their own preferred candidate for that seat. A prominent nominee will use his or her seat to criticize the jurisprudential perspective of the opposing party for decades to come. The standard statement issued by senators is that nominees will be evaluated to ensure they are within the mainstream, 142 and so provocative nominees violate that announced standard.
The logic, therefore, of rejecting numbing is that it generates additional political costs without any corresponding political benefits. Members of the opposing party are provoked by these nominees. Think of, for instance, the greater attention and opposition that Bork elicited. This is true of the lower federal courts as well. The Senate filibuster for lower court nominations was abolished by Senate Democrats because of its usage by Republicans against nominees like Liu.
The Obama Administration therefore largely rejected the numbing strategy, purposefully, and from the beginning of its time in office. 143 Nominees like Hamilton were put forward because they were not extreme. In his second term, President Obama did utilize numbing more frequently. Nina Pillard was nominated to the D.C. Circuit the same day and at the same ceremony as the more establishment Washington lawyer Patricia Millett and sitting federal judge Robert
140.
See Kindy, supra note 124 (contrasting Gorsuch with Pryor by labeling Gorsuch not as "polarizing" as Pryor Pillard immediately galvanized opposition from conservatives, thereby distracting attention from Millett and Wilkins. 145 The tactical merits of Obama Administration's reticence to engage in numbing more often are questionable. The political costs of a provocative nominee are not necessarily any greater than the political costs of any nominee. Senate opposition to candidates can be based on a manufactured sense that a judicial nominee is provocative, even if he or she is not. The opposition to Liu, for instance, was based on a sense from his scholarly writings that he could be more aggressive as a progressive judge. 146 His age (thirty-nine at the time of his nomination) and his political connections (he was a co-author of an article with Hillary Clinton 147 ) suggested a potentially influential judge who could later be elevated to the Supreme Court. David Hamilton, by contrast, was selected by President Obama precisely because he did not seem provocative.
148 However, conservative groups described him as having a "pretty clear leftist record" and labeled him the first pro-abortion judicial candidate nominated by President Obama. 148. See Toobin, supra note 19 ("Hamilton had been vetted with care. After fifteen years of service on the trial bench, he had won the highest rating from the American Bar Association; Richard Lugar, the senior senator from Indiana and a leading Republican, was supportive; and Hamilton's status as a nephew of Lee Hamilton, a well-respected former local congressman, gave him deep connections.").
149. 154. This point is essentially about the nomination of lower court judges. President Obama nominated two Justices to the United States Supreme Court, but these nominations could not have been simultaneous because Justice John Paul Stevens did not resign until after Sonia Sotomayor had been confirmed. See Letter from John Paul Stevens, Supreme Court Justice, to Barack Obama, President (April 9, 2010), strategy is one more applicable to the nomination of judges below the level of the Supreme Court. Discussions about judicial nominations focus almost exclusively on the total number of federal judges nominated by a President. 155 The distribution of these nominations across political time is also important. Presidential administrations that nominate larger volumes of judges simultaneously generate greater oversight costs for the opposing party in the Senate and their supportive interest groups. Scarce political capital for the opposing party is depleted rapidly and substantially by more nominees, while political capital in support of these nominees is ready and potentially increased because of more nominees. Larger volumes of simultaneous nominees also generate pressure to confirm some significant number of these nominees, so as to blunt any problematic narrative about Senate obstruction.
The scarcity of political resources is a definitional feature of political life. The expenditure of political resources generates both a direct cost and an opportunity cost taxing these scarce resources. Political actors only have so many resources to investigate a policy and decide their position on that policy. Political actors only have so many resources to persuade other stakeholders of their position on that policy. Political actors only have so many resources to generate public attention for and move public opinion towards their position on that policy. Scarcity means that resources invested in one policy dimension can become asset-specific resources, not readily transferable to deploy to address some other policy dimension. 156 Scarcity can be a particular challenge for those in political opposition because of the first-mover advantage of many of those in power. 157 When a political actor proposes a policy, it is often the culmination of an investment of substantial resources in the development of that policy. That initial investment has yielded epistemic and stakeholder infrastructure to defend that policy once announced. The opponent of that policy, meanwhile, is put on the defensive, left to generate and consolidate his or her resources immediately or face rapid defeat and/or claims of obstruction of the policy. The political science literature about the power of setting the agenda, for instance, finds unsurprisingly that those in power set the agenda in a way that leaves the opposition disadvantaged. 158 Because of the scarcity of their political resources, opponents are usually left pulling the "fire alarm" for only the most problematic of political actions engaged in by the majority.
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Judicial nominations are susceptible to this same logic of scarcity in opposition. The primary opposition to the president's judicial nominations within government come from members of the opposing party on the Senate Judiciary Committee. The docket of that committee is sufficiently large that judicial nominations are just one small part of the issues that members of that Committee are considering. 160 There are only roughly nine senators and maybe double that number of lawyers working for those senators for the opposition party on the Senate Judiciary Committee. There are interest groups active on judicial nominations-such as the Alliance for Justice on the left and the Judicial Crisis Network on the right-but there are not many of them.
161
There are interest groups that focus on a range of issues, including judicial nominations, such as the AFL-CIO. 162 For those working on with a fait accompli, and it is up to them to respond. 163 but not for lower court nominations, making the task of mobilizing a larger opposition to a nomination quite challenging.
The first-mover advantage can also be large for judicial nominations. If one of the senators from the state of the judicial nomination is both from the opposing party and on the Senate Judiciary Committee, then the opposition party will have advance notice of the nominee and an opportunity to prepare opposition to that nominee. Otherwise, the president and his or her supporters in the Senate will have extensive background information available to them about the nominee at the moment of the nomination, while opponents will be left scrambling to learn about the nominee. Because our federal judicial system is geographically distributed, 164 Senate lawyers and supportive interest groups in Washington can be left researching a trial lawyer in Idaho nominated to the federal district court there. A nominee like David Souter or Harriet Miers leaves opponents scrambling.
165
A judicial nomination is often the culmination of a process of lining up supporters rather than the beginning of that process. Before announcing a nominee, the president's staff will not just look into candidates from within the administration, but also line up supporters outside of the administration. to the selection of a nominee, often to brainstorm the names of potential nominees.
166 President Trump's list of twenty-one potential Supreme Court nominees was compiled with the assistance of several of these organizations, 167 but this consultation often transpires prior to a nomination. When the White House releases the name of a judicial nominee, its supporters are already armed and ready for political battle, while its opponents have not even started to contemplate who to oppose or how to oppose them.
If scarcity is a political reality related to judicial nominations, particularly for those in opposition, it is far from inevitable. There are, after all, only nine Justices on the Supreme Court and 874 Article III judges. President Obama inherited only fifty-nine openings on the federal bench when he became president in January of 2009. 168 President Obama only nominated ten judges or justices during the first six months of his Administration. 169 The evidence suggests that the Obama Administration nominated fewer numbers of judges during their first six months as a willful attempt to signal respect to Republican Senators by making it easier for them to evaluate these judges. 170 Fire alarms are only needed to respond to judicial nominations when there are so many fires that police patrols are impossible 171 -and there need not be many judicial nominations fires.
Therefore, one means of making salient the resource scarcity of opposition to judicial nominees is to nominate a large number of candidates simultaneously because political capital rarely can be increased proportionally in response. Senate and interest group staffing cannot be increased substantially and immediately, since both tend to utilize fiscal year funding that could not be changed until the next fiscal year. This leaves finite number of staff members researching large numbers of nominees. Stakeholders within and outside of the Senate must be redeployed to focus on opposing the nomination. Meanwhile, those supportive of the nomination from within the administration, the Senate, the interest group community, and the home state of the nominee have been mobilized and are prepared with their justifications for the nominee.
Depleted political resources can be replenished over time. Opposition research that could not be done on a nominee one week can be done the next week. Interest groups that cannot be convened one week can be convened the next week. The simultaneous strategy, though, prevents that from transpiring.
Multiple simultaneous nominations also place pressure on the opposing party in the Senate to confirm some of these nominees. 172 The more nominees being held up in the Senate at any given time, the easier it is for the president and the media to target the opposing party for playing politics with judicial nominations. 173 This leaves the opposition party with an undesirable choice. The opposing party in the Senate can spend few resources to target each nominee, or a lot of resources to target a few nominees. If it pursues the first course of action, it will struggle to defeat any nominee because not enough opposition will notice the nomination and mobilize against it. If it pursues the second course of action, it will mean that the rest of the nominees-who could also be provocative-will more easily be confirmed as a result of the absence of opposition.
President George W. Bush utilized the simultaneous nominations strategy many times. He nominated eleven judges to the courts of appeals on one day in September of 2001. 174 Included within that list were several notable conservative judges. 175 He nominated five to the appellate courts on the same day in January of 2003 and two more within the next month. 176 In February of 2005, he nominated six to appellate courts.
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Senate Democrats were left with limited resources to respond. When John Roberts was nominated to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in 2003 as part of the simultaneous nominations of that year, it was known at the time that was a potential future Supreme Court nominee. 178 Because of the volume of nominees, though, Senate Republicans successfully moved to have Roberts testify the same day before the Senate Judiciary Committee as several other nominees. 179 Other prominent Bush nominees-such as Neil Gorsuch, President Trump's Supreme Court nominee-did not receive much attention by overwhelmed Senate Democrats and were therefore unanimously confirmed. 180 By contrast, the Obama Administration largely avoided simultaneous nominations. 181 There was only one day during his first term when he nominated more than two judges to a federal court of appeals. 182 The moments when the Obama Administration did attempt this strategy illustrated the merits of the strategy. On June 4, 2013, President Obama stood "[i]n a formal Rose Garden ceremony normally reserved for Supreme Court hopefuls and prominent cabinet nominees."
183 He nominated three candidates for the D.C. Circuit, at least one of whom (Cornellia T.L. Pillard) was more controversial. 184 This was immediately perceived by Senate Republicans as a noncooperative act. 185 All three were confirmed, 186 with Pillard absorbing the brunt of the attacks by Republican senators and with only limited resources remaining to evaluate and attack the other two D.C. Circuit nominees. 187 The cooperative behavior of nominating fewer numbers of judges did not generate a differential and more cooperative response by Senate Republicans. Hamilton was the only Obama nominee to the court of appeals for a few weeks and attracted lots of attention and opposition from Republican senators. 188 When more judges are nominated simultaneously, the same motivation to oppose these nominees is present-but the ability to do so is less pronounced because of resource scarcity. If anything, then, simultaneous nomination of large numbers of nominees reduces political opposition. The motivation to oppose is constant, but the opportunity to do so is limited.
Simultaneous nominees can increase the political capital available to the president and his or her nominees. For political supporters, simultaneous nominations of large numbers of nominees is a signal that the president is serious about the cause of judicial nominations and serious about pursuing that cause. The president is signaling that his or her administration has been expending substantial political resources to locate large numbers of nominees, and is willing to expend these resources to ensure these nominees are confirmed. This cost endured by the administration makes simultaneous nominations a credible signal of seriousness on the issue. 189 Interest groups are therefore more likely to expend their limited resources pushing for these nominees. Meanwhile, supporters of the president hear from and are informed by him or her that this is an important issue, which stimulates supporter interest and activity.
CONCLUSION
Since Ronald Reagan became President of the United States in 1981, the Democratic Party has been playing defense on judicial nominations. The Republican Party made finding their most talented legal minds and putting them on the federal bench a major priority. Many of the great theorists of the jurisprudential right-Michael McConnell, Richard Posner, Antonin Scalia-went from the academy to the bench. 190 Many of the great lawyers of the jurisprudential rightJohn Roberts, Jeffrey Sutton-went from practice to the bench. 191 These superstars before the bench became superstars on the bench, writing opinions that are widely known, 192 and sending their law clerks on to become the next generation of elite lawyers and law professors.
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Presidents Clinton and Obama, both former law professors, did not put together the nominations record to match what happened when a Republican was in the White House. Lawyers on the left watched with disappointment, but also with awe and admiration. Conservatives had admired the liberal legal movement's success in the Warren Court years inside and outside of court, and aspired to create the organizational structure to emulate it. Now, a generation later, liberals feel the same. 194 They wanted their own president to transform the federal courts in their favored direction. Just as the Federalist Society looked to liberals a generation ago for a roadmap to success, Democrats have started to believe that identifying the triumphs of conservatives on judicial nominations is a good place to start.
The argument of this Essay has been that the institutional practices of judicial nominations have generated a discrete list of political strategies that work better for presidents trying to maximize their nominations successes. These strategies feature certain common dimensions that mean that just as they worked for past Republican presidents, they could have worked for President Obama and can work for future Democratic presidents. The road to future nominations success for Democrats involves staying in the same lines that Republican presidents have created.
Staying in those lines, though, involves a political ethos that has largely been lacking in the Democratic Party for at least a generation: a willingness aggressively to prioritize and push judicial nominations. President Obama's limitations on judicial nominations were not the result of losing a brutal political fight, but of largely not starting one at all. The past several years have witnessed a resurgence of energy in the Democratic Party, and a desire to revisit political tactics. Regardless of the ideological preferences of voters or officials, there has been a gradual trend towards pursuing these preferences with a renewed intensity. Past institutional norms that Democratic Party leaders refused to flout have now been reframed as norms that can be leveraged tactically to achieve maximum outputs. With this motivation to engage in more aggressive political tactics, the next Democratic president could 194. TELES, supra note 41, at 22-57.
